Part I: Philosophy. David (D. M.) Armstrong is one of Australia's greatest philosophers. [42] Armstrong believes that the challenge that dispositionalism presents for his account of laws of nature is not in the case of manifested dispositions (say, a glass dropping on the ground and breaking) but unmanifested dispositions (the fact that counter factually if one were to drop the glass on the ground, it would break). During his career, he was a visiting lecturer at a number of institutions including Yale, Stanford, the University of Notre Dame, the University of Texas at Austin and Franklin and Marshall College. Im Anschluss erfolgte ein Aufbaustudium an der Oxford University von 1952 bis 1954. Juli 1926, Melbourne, Australien; † 13. In universal: Platonic and Aristotelian realism …by the contemporary Australian philosopher David Armstrong, universals are perhaps not quite as immanent as they are according to the bundle theorists, but they nevertheless obey an Aristotelian “principle of instantiation,” insofar as no universal can exist without instances. [12] He also served in the Royal Australian Navy, in which his father had been a commodore. Moore. He gives the example of a woman who has learned her husband is dead but cannot bring herself to believe her husband is dead. Mass would thus be a universal (subject to mass not being discarded by future physicists). [53], On the question of the relationship between beliefs and knowledge, Armstrong defends a "weak acceptance" of the belief condition, namely that if a person can be said to know some thing p, he or she believes p. In a paper for the Aristotelian Society, Armstrong rejects a series of linguistic arguments for a rejection of the belief condition which argue that one can have knowledge without having belief because a common usage of the word 'belief' is to imply lack of knowledge—Armstrong gives the example of if you asked a man on a railway station whether the train has just left and he said "I believe it has", you would take from this that he does not know that it has. Taking Wittgenstein's Tractatus as his point of departure, Professor Armstrong argues that nonactual possibilities and possible worlds are recombinations of actually existing elements, and as such are useful fictions. [52] The intuitions that lead to this kind of externalism led Alvin Plantinga towards an account of knowledge that added the requirement for 'properly-functioning' cognitive systems operating according to a design plan. Rather, it died mainly because of some virus that just happened to sweep through the population. Seine Arbeiten haben die Entwicklung der Logik und Sprachphilosophie maßgeblich vorangetrieben. Dabei setzt er sich von Gesetzesauffassungen in der Tradition David Humes ab, die Naturgesetze auf Regularitäten zurückführen wollen. [11], Armstrong married Jennifer Mary de Bohun Clark in 1982 and had step children. Talk by James Franklin on the life and work of philosopher David Malet Armstrong, given to the Glebe Realists on 3 Nov 2020. Objects have structure: they have parts, those parts are made of molecules, which are in turn made up of atoms standing in relation to one another, which are in turn made up of subatomic particles and so on. Il a également développé une ontologie des états de choses (states of affairs) associée à une épistémologie des vérifacteurs (truthmakers). Melbourne University Press, Melbourne 1960. [5] He was elected a Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2008. "The Nature of Mind" is a philosophical essay by David Armstrong, originally published in The Nature of Mind and Other Essays in 1980. ", "An Interview with Professor David Armstrong", "D.M. [46], The difficulty in providing an adequate account of truthmakers for events in the past is one reason Armstrong gives for rejecting presentism—the view that only the present exists (another reason being the incompatibility of such a view with special relativity). [8], In 1974, when the University of Sydney's Philosophy department split into two departments[9]—the Department for General Philosophy and the Department for Traditional and Modern Philosophy—Armstrong joined the latter along with David Stove and Keith Campbell, while the former department pursued more radical politics and taught courses on Marxism and feminism. Ein zentrales Element in Armstrongs Werk ist sein Universalienrealismus. His chief philosophical achievement has been the development of a core metaphysical programme, embracing the topics of universals, laws, modality and facts: a naturalistic metaphysics, consistent with a scientific view of the natural world. David Armstrong (Philosophy Now, Band 11) | Mumford, Stephen | ISBN: 9780773533318 | Kostenloser Versand für alle Bücher mit Versand und Verkauf duch Amazon. [23], Armstrong further rejects nominalisms that deny that properties and relations exist in reality because he suggests that these sorts of nominalisms, specifically referring to what he calls class nominalism, and resemblance nominalism, postulate primitives of either class membership or resemblance. [6], Keith Campbell said that Armstrong's contributions to metaphysics and epistemology "helped to shape philosophy's agenda and terms of debate", and that Armstrong's work "always concerned to elaborate and defend a philosophy which is ontically economical, synoptic, and compatibly continuous with established results in the natural sciences". Armstrong did not accept behaviourism and instead defended a theory he referred to as the "central-state theory" which identifies mental states with the state of the central nervous system. Am bekanntesten sind seine Arbeiten zur Indexikalität von Demonstrativpronomen. Armstrong's response is to affirm a theory he describes as the Principle of Instantial Invariance, wherein the adicity of properties are essential and invariant. To say that these are distinct senses of the wordpresupposes that universal and abstract object do notmean the same thing. Armstrong vertrat einen reduktiven Physikalismus. Eine zweite Ehe schloss er 1982 mit Jennifer Mary de Bohun Clark. Armstrong a défendu le physicalisme en métaphysique, le réalisme scientifique dans le champ épistémologique, ainsi qu'une forme réductionniste de matérialisme en philosophie de l'esprit. [26] MacBride argues that there can be relations where the number of terms in the relation varies across instances. Armstrong identifies the laws as holding between universals rather than particulars as an account of laws involving just particulars rather than universals would not adequately explain how laws of nature operate in the case of counterfactuals.[40]. [47], Armstrong holds to a physicalist, functionalist theory of the mind. Part IV: Minds, Bodies, and Persons. [34], Central to Armstrong's philosophy is the idea of states of affairs ("facts" in Russell's terminology): in Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics, Armstrong claims that states of affairs are "the fundamental structures in reality". David Armstrong is one of Australia's greatest philosophers. [43], Regarding truth, Armstrong holds to what he describes as a "maximalist version" of truthmaker theory: he believes that every truth has a truthmaker, although there doesn't necessarily exist a one-to-one mapping between truth and truthmaker. One bird could have escaped the virus only to be eaten by a predator on the day before its fiftieth birthday. In another, more modernbut equally entrenched sense, it implies the rejection of abstractobjects. One obvious task for an introductory text concerning the work of a particular philosopher is to express the central ideas of that philosopher in as clear a manner as possible. It may be the case that R (a, b) obtains in the world but R (b, a) does not. Diese stellt sich Armstrong jedoch in dem Sinne als abhängig von Gegenständen vor, dass sie nicht unabhängig von ihnen existieren können. But Armstrong differs on this: the unconfident examinee has a belief that Queen Elizabeth I died in 1603, he knows that she died in 1603, but he does not know that he knows. Knowledge traditionally entails true belief, but true belief does not entail knowledge. [45] Negative truths have truthmakers in Armstrong's account: he gives the example of a wall that is painted green. [54], Armstrong also argues that contradictory beliefs show that there is a connection between beliefs and knowledge. He provides an analogy to the argument in Euthyphro: to say that electrons are electrons because they are part of the class of electrons puts the cart before the horse. He justifies this by saying that the physical world "seems obviously to exist" while other things "seem much more hypothetical". David (D. M.) Armstrong is one of Australia's greatest philosophers. David Armstrong (1926-2014) often D. M. Armstrong, was a prominent Australian Philosopher. David Armstrong. He taught at Birkbeck College in 1954–55, then at the University of Melbourne from 1956–63. Also muss es auch Eigenschaften geben, welche die Tatsachen über Eigenschaften wahr machen. Nach dem Schulbesuch in Oxford und Australien sowie Militärdienst bei der australischen Marine (1945/46) studierte Armstrong an der University of Sydney ab 1947 Philosophie. He has forgotten that at some point previously, he studied English history. True/False. The word ‘Nominalism’, as used by contemporaryphilosophers in the Anglo-American tradition, is ambiguous. 1926 in Melbourne geboren, studierte er vier Jahre lang in Sydney Philosophie, um dann 1952 bis 1954 in Oxford das von Gilbert Ryle neu eingerichtete, in zwei Jahren zum B.Phil. Armstrong vertrat einen reduktiven Physikalismus. [14], To mark the 50th anniversary in 2014 of Armstrong's appointment to the Challis Chair of Philosophy at Sydney University, Quadrant magazine published a tribute to him (originally written in 1991) by David Stove[15] and an overview of Armstrong's work by Andrew Irvine. Zudem wählte man ihn im Jahre 1998 zum korrespondierenden Mitglied der British Academy[1] und 2008 als ausländisches Ehrenmitglied in die American Academy of Arts and Sciences. [25], Armstrong's theory of universals treats relations as having no particular ontological difficulty, they can be treated in the same way non-relational properties are. [28], In Armstrong's view, nominalisms can also be criticised for producing a blob theory of reality. [27], Armstrong rejects nominalist accounts of properties that attempt to align properties simply with classes. [51] Here, Armstrong's view is broadly similar to that of Alvin Goldman and Robert Nozick. David Armstrong (Philosophy Now) | Mumford, Stephen | ISBN: 9781844650996 | Kostenloser Versand für alle Bücher mit Versand und Verkauf duch Amazon. Philosophie. David Malet Armstrong (born 8 July 1926), often D. M. Armstrong, is an Australian philosopher.He is well known for his work on metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, and for his defence of a factualist ontology, a functionalist theory of the mind, an externalist epistemology, and a necessitarian conception of the laws of nature. In 1964, he became Challis Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney, where he stayed until his retirement in 1991. David Benjamin Kaplan (* 1933) ist ein US-amerikanischer Philosoph. In Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics, Armstrong states that his philosophical system rests upon "the assumption that all that exists is the space time world, the physical world as we say". A student is asked when Queen Elizabeth I died, and he hesitatingly answers "1603" and exhibits no confidence in his answer. [48] Armstrong attributes his adoption of the central-state theory to the work of J. J. C. Smart—specifically the paper 'Sensations and Brain Processes'—and traces the lineage from there to Ullin Place's 1956 paper 'Is Consciousness a Brain Process? Published: May 31, 2008. Armstrong: Sydney's most distinguished philosopher: life and work", "David Armstrong and Australian Materialism", "The KK (Knowing that One Knows) Principle", David Armstrong (1926-2014), Sydney philosopher, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=David_Malet_Armstrong&oldid=1013648030, Fellows of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, All Wikipedia articles written in Australian English, Wikipedia articles with BIBSYS identifiers, Wikipedia articles with CINII identifiers, Wikipedia articles with PLWABN identifiers, Wikipedia articles with SELIBR identifiers, Wikipedia articles with SNAC-ID identifiers, Wikipedia articles with SUDOC identifiers, Wikipedia articles with Trove identifiers, Wikipedia articles with WORLDCATID identifiers, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License, This page was last edited on 22 March 2021, at 18:51. Armstrong then suggests that a supervenience relation exists between these second order properties and the ontologically authentic universals given to us by physics. Februar 2021 um 20:32 Uhr bearbeitet. Dieser besagt, dass es neben Gegenständen auch noch Eigenschaften als respektable, grundlegende Entitäten gebe. In his essay The Nature of Mind, Armstrong outlines a philosophical account of the mind that is compatible with the Materialist scientific view of the mind. [23], Armstrong's theory of universals gives him the basis for an understanding of laws of nature as being relations between universals, a non-Humean account of laws of nature proposed independently by Armstrong,[37] Michael Tooley,[38] and Fred Dretske. It is primarily through his work that Australian philosophy, and Australian metaphysics in particular, enjoys … How Armstrong's theory of universals deals with relations with varying adicities has been raised as an issue by Fraser MacBride. Dort erwarb er 1960 den PhD. [32], In terms of the origin of Armstrong's view of universals, Armstrong says his view of universals is "relatively unexplored territory" but points to Hilary Putnam's 1970 paper 'On Properties'[33] as a possible forerunner. Armstrong war der Sohn des Commodore J.M.Armstrong, der in der US-Navy Dienst tat. Seine Hauptarbeitsgebiete waren die Philosophie des Geistes, Ontologie und Wissenschaftstheorie. Dies gilt auch für Naturgesetze, die Armstrong als Relationen zwischen Universalien versteht. Bertrand Russell, “The Argument from Analogy for Other Minds” Gilbert Ryle, “Descartes’s Myth” David M. Armstrong, “The Nature of Mind” Multiple-Choice. His chief philosophical achievement has been the development of a core metaphysical programme, embracing the topics of universals, laws, modality and facts: a naturalistic metaphysics, consistent with a scientific view of the natural world. This allows the explanation of laws of nature that have not been instantiated. Im Jahr 1950 heiratete er Madeleine Annette Haydon. David Malet Armstrong (8 July 1926 – 13 May 2014), often D. M. Armstrong, was an Australian philosopher. In Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics, Armstrong states that his philosophical system rests upon "the assumption that all that exists is the space time world, the physical world as we say". His chief philosophical achievement has been the development of a core metaphysical programme, embracing the topics of universals, laws, modality and facts: a naturalistic metaphysics, consistent with a scientific view of the natural world. He initially was attracted to Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind and the rejection of Cartesian dualism. Stephen Mumford, David Armstrong, Acumen, 2007, 206pp., $22.95 (pbk), ISBN 9781844651009. A philosophy might take its general inspiration from (1) commonsense; (2) careful observation; (3) philosophical argumentation; (4) the sciences; (5) "higher" sources of illumination. [35] A state of affairs roughly put is an instantiation of a particular and a universal: a state of affairs might be that a particular atom exists, instantiating a universal (say, that it is of a particular element, if chemical elements are ultimately accepted as part of Armstrong's universals). Armstrongs Hauptgrund für die Annahme von Universalien ist das von ihm so genannte truth maker principle (Wahrmacherprinzip): Für jede kontingente Wahrheit muss es etwas geben, was sie wahr macht. [39] This account posits that the relations between universals are truthmakers for the statements about physical laws, and it is realist as it accepts that laws of nature are a feature of the world rather than just a way we talk about the world. David Malet Armstrong, oft D. M. Armstrong (* 8. He justifies this by saying that the physical world "seems obviously to exist" while other things "seem much more hypothetical". Armstrong rejects the KK Principle—that to know some thing p, one must know that one knows p.[54][55] Armstrong's rejection of the KK Principle is consistent with his wider externalist project. Without states of affairs instantiating the particulars and universals (including relations), we cannot account for the truth of the one case and the falsity of the other. Armstrong realises that we will need to refer to and use properties that are not considered universals in his sparse ontology—for instance, being able to refer to something being a game (to use the example from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations). Vor. This primitive results in a vicious regress for both kinds of nominalisms,[30] Armstrong suggests, thus motivating his states-of-affairs based system that unites properties by postulating a primitive tie of instantiation [31] based on a fact-ontology, called states of affairs. Armstrong rejects dispositionalism, the idea that dispositional properties (or powers as they are sometimes referred to) are ontologically significant and have an important role in explaining laws of nature. Reviewed by Alexander Bird, University of Bristol. Cookie-Einstellungen Diese Website benutzt Cookies, die für den technischen Betrieb der Website erforderlich sind und stets gesetzt werden. Armstrong, David Malet. He previously married Madeleine Annette Haydon in 1950.